Fifth combined forecast for the 2024 general election

By Stephen Fisher, John Kenny, Paul Furey, and Polina Ryzhuk. 26th June 2024.

The average of different kinds of seats forecasts points to a Labour majority of 200; the same as last week. There is very little change for other parties, except that the average forecast for the Conservatives is down from 127 last week to 123 this week. That is despite a rise for the Tories in the simple-model projections (uniform change from opinion polls). The Conservative seat forecast is down in both the non-MRP complex models and the MRP average, which is now forecasting just 92 seats for the Conservatives. That average is now based on 9 different MRP models.

Table 1. Seat Forecasts

Betting MarketsComplex modelsSimple modelsMRPAverage
Con8911919492123
Lab434431381453425
LD5254365549
Reform44043
Green21122
SNP2120172120
PC33333
Lab majority218212112256200

Table 2 below lists the latest MRP estimates. The variance between them continues to be remarkable.

Table 2. MRP seat forecasts

LabConLDReformGreensSNPPCMajority
Electoral Calculus 457766632224264
Find Out Now 4506071184244250
Focaldata 4501105011162250
Ipsos 4531153833154256
More in Common 4061554901182162
Savanta 51653500084382
Survation456725671372262
We Think 465765233293280
YouGov4251086752204200
Average453925542213255

Figure 1 shows how the forecasts of the size of a Labour majority have changed since the start of the campaign. 

Figure 1. Forecasts for the size of a Labour majority

Table 3 shows estimates of probabilities and pseudo probabilities for different election outcomes. Averaging the different sources suggests a 95% chance of a Labour government and an 90% chance of a Labour majority. Both numbers one point higher than the corresponding estimates from last week. 

Table 3. Probabilities (%)

Betting marketsModelsPollsCitizen forecastVolunteeredAverage
Lab Majority97961006790
Lab 100+ Majority6161
Con led Gov301705
Lab led Gov981008310095

Figure 2 shows how stable the predicted probabilities of a Labour majority have been since the start of the campaign. 

Figure 2. Predicted probabilities of a Labour majority

Table 4 summarises forecasts for vote shares. The Conservatives and Labour are down a point each again this week. The Labour lead remains at 20 points. Reform UK, are up a further point, to 16 per cent. No net change since last week for the Liberal Democrats and the Greens. 

Table 4. Vote share forecasts (%GB except where stated)

Poll aggregatesBetting marketsModelsMRPAverage
Con2121202321
Lab4140414241
Lib Dem1111111111
Reform1617171316
Green6 656
SNP (Scotland)313231
PC (Wales only)141213
Lab-Con lead2019211920

Figure 3 shows the forecasts for the Labour lead over the Conservatives in the GB share of the vote. The betting markets have converged with the average MRP estimate of the lead. But all the indicators remain very similar and the lead has been very stable. 

Figure 3. Forecasts for the Labour lead in vote share

Estimates come from data collected late afternoon and early evening on 26th June 2024.

Methodology

The idea of combining forecasts from different sources has a good track record, though it has to be admitted that our attempts for the 2017 general election and the 2016 Brexit referendum did not work out so well. For reviews of previous combined forecasts here for 2017 and here for 2019. Also worth noting is the experience of the pollyvote.com combined forecast of the US presidential elections.

The basic approach is to combine forecasts by averaging them within each category and then average across categories. Since the different sources do not all present similar figures that can be averaged on a like-for-like basis there are various judgement calls we have had to make on how to treat the data.

Polls

For vote shares, we use the various available polling averages. Some admittedly are quite sophisticated, allowing for house effects, but they are nonetheless estimates of current public opinion and not future votes. 

To estimate a pseudo-probability of a Labour majority from the polls, we take the proportion of pollsters with a GB Labour lead greater than 12 points, on the basis that this is the level required for a Labour majority under traditional uniform change assumptions. Similarly, the proportion of the most recent polls from each pollster with a lead of 19 points or more serves as a pseudo probability for the chances of a Labour majority of over 100 (making allowances for current polling in Scotland and Wales).

Statistical models

We have divided statistical models into simple (poll average plus uniform swing seats projections), Multilevel Regression and Poststratification (MRP), and other complex models (anything more elaborate than uniform change but not necessarily particularly complex). Within these categories we simply average the available estimates of seats and shares. We have not excluded any models based on quality, but they do have to be statistical models as opposed to personal guesses. 

Betting markets

For the seats forecasts we are using the mid points of the spread betting for the markets. The markets might collectively imply fewer or more seats forecast for the parties in total than there are seats to be won in Britain. This is because the markets are separate for each party and do not need to be consistent collectively. 

Betting markets for shares of the vote are typically done in bands. We take the mid points of the bands with the highest implied probabilities weighted by their implied probabilities from the betting odds. We then average across bookies.

Citizen forecasts

Some polls ask people what they think that the outcome of the election will be. We call these ‘citizen forecasts.’ Different pollsters use different survey questions but they can be combined to generate pseudo-probabilities. We use the proportion of poll respondents who think there will be a Labour majority, excluding “don’t knows” and re-percentaging, as the pseudo-probability of a Labour majority. We treat the question of whether Rishi Sunak will continue as prime minister to be equivalent to the Conservatives getting a majority, because they do not have any clear governing partners in the event of a hung parliament. Where appropriate, the probability of a Labour led government is taken to be 100 minus the probability of a Conservative led one. But that is not the case for questions where respondents are given the chance to say they think there will be some “other” kind of government. We use the most recent poll with a citizen forecast survey question from each pollster and only those in recent weeks. Only a few pollsters ask citizen forecast questions. 

Volunteered forecasts

These come from the Good Judgement Project, which encourages people to forecast the outcomes of various events in order to develop and improve their forecasting skills. The people providing their predictions to the Good Judgement Project are not necessarily experts, but nor can they be seen as a representative sample, and so we report their predictions separately as ‘volunteered’ forecasts. 

Sources:

Betting Markets:

Betfair

Betfair Exchange

Betfred

Ladbrokes

Oddschecker

Paddy Power

Smarkets

Sporting Index

Models (Elaborate):

Bradshaw Advisory

Financial Times

Forecast UK

New Statesman (Britain Predicts)

PM and Pendulum: Lebo and Norpoth

Principal Fish

The Economist

UKelect

UK Polling Report

Models (MRP):

Electoral Calculus

Find out now/Mirror

Focaldata

Ipsos

More in Common

YouGov  

Savanta/Telegraph

Survation/Best for Britain

We Think/Economist

Models (simple):

Authors’ own uniform change projections with England, Scotland and Wales separate. Change in England taken from the average of the most recent GB vote intention poll from each pollster.

Poll Aggregates:

BBC

Britain Elects

Economist

Electionpolling

Financial Times

Guardian

Politico

Principalfish

Sky

Telegraph

Authors’ own aggregations

Volunteered:

Good Judgment Project

Citizen Forecasts:

Redfield and Wilton (31 May-2 June)

YouGov (2nd June 2024)

We Think (21st June 2024)

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