by Stephen Fisher.

It is not hard to see why Leave won. Evidence from numerous opinion polls showed that there was a clear majority for Leave on the basis of concerns about immigration and beliefs that leaving would reduce immigration. Moreover the same opinion polls showed us that there was no compensating majority who believed that the UK would be worse off if we left. Still less did people feel that they personally would be financially worse off. For further details see here.

Although it should not have come as a surprise that Leave won, the result was close enough that it could easily have gone the other way. There will be much debate as to whether the Remain side could have made their arguments more persuasively and campaigned more effectively. With such a close result a host of relatively small differences could all have made a difference. It will be hard for survey and other academic research to identify what, if anything was decisive.

Turnout, at 72%, was the highest for any UK-wide vote since 1992. Whilst this might constitute a relatively high level of participation by recent standards, it does still mean that 28% of registered voters did not bother to have their say in what, we were frequently told, was the most important national decision in our lifetimes. If opinion poll questions on likelihood of voting are at least roughly right, it is likely to transpire that non-voters more often favoured remaining. Moreover it is probably the case that if everyone eligible had voted then the UK would have chosen to Remain.

The local authority results provide some evidence that the divisions in society suggested by the opinion polls as important for referendum voting were born out. Places with more pensioners were more likely to vote for Leave.

The Remain vote was higher where there were more graduates.

These are geographical manifestations of primarily individual-level differences. There are also others related to ethnic diversity and economic prosperity.

The national divides are the most notable aspect of the political geography. Both Northern Ireland and Scotland voted Remain (at 56% and 62% respectively). Both England and Wales voted 53% Leave.

The only region within England to vote Remain was London, and it did so strongly with 60% of the vote. Setting aside London, the rest of England voted solidly, 55%, for Leave. While it is true that the Leave vote was strongest in the English countryside, many of the big cities voted Leave, including Birmingham, Sheffield, Bradford, Sunderland, Bolton, Newcastle, and Stoke. While the North and Midlands were stronger for Leave than the South of England, there were cities in the South, such as Plymouth, Southampton and Swindon, that voted Leave.

In the end only 52 out of 293 local authorities in England outside London voted to Remain. Similarly only 5 out of 22 Welsh council areas voted to Remain. Outside London, the preference for leave was widespread in England and Wales.

by Stephen Fisher and Alan Renwick.

It is commonly asserted by people commenting on the EU referendum that people tend to be risk averse and so vote against change. The Prime Minister appealed to people not to “roll the dice” on their children’s and grandchildren’s future. Daniel Hannan in his book Why Vote Leave accepted the idea of risk aversion in referendums, and then argued that people should see remaining in the EU as more risky than leaving.

But is it really true that people tend to vote against change in referendums? There are certainly several examples in Britain where people have rejected change, the most prominent examples include the referendums on Scottish Independence, the Alternative Vote electoral system, and, in 1975, the UK’s membership of the European Community. But it is also true that people in different parts of Britain have voted for change in referendums on numerous occasions. They voted for a Scottish Parliament (and separately to give it tax varying powers), a Welsh Assembly (and later for it to have more power), a Greater London Assembly, and the Good Friday Agreement. Setting aside referendums at the sub-regional level, the change option has won in six out of the thirteen referendums that have been held in the UK.

It maybe objected that both of the UK wide referendum results have been for the status-quo. True. So what if we cast our net further afield?

Continue reading Do people tend to vote against change in referendums? →

by Stephen Fisher.

The prominent Leave campaigners are at pains to point out how much they love Europe. Boris Johnston says he is a proud European. Leavers claim to love Europe but hate the EU.

Meanwhile leading figures in the Remain camp dare not admit to any fondness for either Europe or the EU. Their eurosceptic tone emphasises UK membership as a marriage of convenience, to be justified by considerations of UK interests alone. This makes plenty of sense as a pitch to a population that overwhelmingly dislikes the institutions of the EU and who identify with Britain or one of the home nations much more than they think of themselves as European.

For the large majority of people in the UK pretty much the only substantial reason for voting Remain is economic. “Project Fear” is not only the obvious strategy for the Remain campaign, it is pretty much the only possible one that could secure them victory. The main reason why the polls are suggesting the outcome of this referendum will be close is that the public are not yet convinced the economy will suffer, and in particular that they personally would be worse off, if we left.

Continue reading What is going on in the EU referendum? Some comments based on opinion poll evidence →